These are a couple manuscripts I was developing for publication, but one had too little data and other too much.
Influence of Master Agreements on Execution of Clinical Trial Project Agreements
Essays on Rahner's Spirit in the World - Introduction
Rahner and Lonergan both take from Thomas the idea that intelligence is central to our existence, but, whereas Lonergan, in Verbum, speculated that there might be a Thomist epistemology, Rahner investigates the possibility of an ontological intellectual intuition. Of course, Lonergan agrees that, "One knows by what one is", in the same way that Rahner says there is, "that prior understanding which man as man is." This intellectual intuition, however, would need something like Lonergan's method for a scientific investigation - a theory of knowledge. Rahner is more interested in the information and relationships that awaken our knowledge. "The human metaphysical consideration of what man is begins at this point because in every man there is already realized what is to be understood conceptually in what follows: the human, intellective soul has its face turned towards the phantasm."
Rahner believes there must be a foundation underlying the knower and the known. What is known, for example, is limited by cognitive power just as intelligence is limited by the objects of experience. The intrinsic possibility of knowledge is based on the intrinsic possibility of knowability. Different kinds of knowing, therefore, must be related to different kinds of objects, and measuring this unique relationship points to some ground that Thomas leaves as a question. A discussion of angels follows, similar to what Lonergan examines in Verbum, and Rahner concludes that Thomas meant to question how far intelligence can establish itself within these limits, and go beyond them. Rahner ends with a retorsion that if intelligence can transcend its own realm then forming the idea is evidence for that. If not then the possibility of such a position proves the idea.
So, Rahner discards the idea of a purely intellectual intuition. But how can there be metaphysics without a direct view beyond the boundary of our imagination? His conclusion is that the possibility of metaphysics must at least derive from what is possible in our imagination. The question is the possibility of transcendence without an intellectual intuition, at the level of the imagination, "and has an intimation in the limit idea (Grenzidee) of an intellectual intuition." Objects are proportionately ordered to the human intellect in this peculiar relation of the knower to the known. This gives some preliminary indication to what is involved with the question of what conversion to the phantasm means.
The possibility of moving beyond the boundary of our intellect must involve the relationship between knowing and known in our imagination and the turn to phantasm. Our different ways of knowing are developed by the limits imposed by intellect on the objects of experience as well as by the objects on that experience. In any case, we know by what we are, "Or", as Lonergan says, "is one to say that, since we know by what we are, so also we know that we know by knowing what we are?" I think it is at this point that the two philosophers diverge in their investigation. Lonergan obviously pursues rational reflection on ourselves, and Rahner will next give some preliminary indication of all that is involved with the questions raised by the conversion to the phantasm.
Section VII: The Second Part of the Third Section of the Corpus
. . . continuing . . .
Rahner says we grasp the intellect and object in a single act of comprehension. Whether we consider them as
one, or in parallel, an underlying, unified ground is implied. There is a double transcendence in this union
that is otherwise limited by space and time in our imagination.
I couldn't follow Rahner's references to the major and minor premises of Thomas' presentation, but the idea is that the intellect united with the corporeal is grasped in a single act of comprehension. He questions how it could be otherwise as-if the intellect were alone in its intuitions when it is in union. Likewise, there is no sense talking-about a corporeal insight into the nature of things without intelligent act. This union is the peculiar activity previously mentioned in regard to thinking about the essence of things in the first place. A few examples illustrating this single act might be useful, but this only is an introduction. And, it leads to the question, "where do we get this simultaneous comprehension of both at once?"
It begins with the limitation that space and time place on our imagination, and it implies a unified ground. I don't know if Rahner assumes this principle of space and time from Kant, and I don't think it's true, but he does explain, similar to Lonergan, that we think about things here and now in this or that place. The main idea is that some shared ground underlies the peculiar relation where thinking is restricted to objects of our attention and the objects are likewise restricted by our cognitive power. This is why he takes a stand on the idea that any metaphysical insight must be through our imagination which is itself limited by space and time. It struck me last night that the discussion of angels is an example of how our imagination can exceed these limits, but that's an idea I need to work-out on my own. Following Rahner here, the emphasis is on thinking and objects as they limit each other whether we consider one or the other in combination or in parallel. The insight gained through this investigation yields a double comprehension.
Trying to grasp the single whole from one or the other of its moments, or from both of them, one after the other, is what Thomas will investigate in the next section. The double apprehension will turn-out that both times the whole is grasped. The intellect is united with the corporeal, and some ground anchors them both. They are dependent one-on-another, although they can be considered in combination or in parallel, Our understanding is limited by our imagination which is naturally limited by space and time. We'll see what Rahner makes of this double apprehension. He thinks there can be transcendence in either case, and the single grasp may be leading us to a possible metaphysics.
Below is the summary he gives from the end of VII.
"The essence of human knowing and that of its object can
only be apprehended in a single act of comprehension because
they are reciprocally the ground of their intrinsic possibility and
therefore ultimately spring from a single ground. Hence
whichever of the two is to be apprehended, this apprehension
always comprehends both of them. Not taking this into account,
one can try to grasp this single whole from one or the other of
its moments, or from both of them, one after the other. This
double apprehension is what Thomas is undertaking here.
Thus the two following parts of the third section of the
corpus treat the essence of the object of human knowledge and
the essence of human knowledge one after the other. In so
doing, it must turn out that both times the whole is grasped."
Is he justified in saying that there is an intrinsic possibility for the essence of knower and known, and therefore they spring from a single ground?
. . . and further onward . . .
So, another installment of Rahner's Introduction. This comes from VIII. The Third Part of the Third Section
of the Corpus. There's a comment on quiddity and what it implies about our knowledge of objects. Sensation is
entertained as a possible companion to intellect in this process. In summary, this is the section of the
whither and the whereat.
An admittedly awkward combination of words, but they are derived from what quiddity means in our modes of apprehension which always turns to an object. Lonergan, I would say, agrees that we always apprehend some thing, and in this process Rahner distinguishes quiddity as the essence of the knowing of the nature of a thing. Knowing is always about something, and knowing itself has an essence. The knowing is of the nature such that the knowing is not about its own essence. The essence of our knowledge remains unknown because our knowing refers to knowledge of corporeal matter. Turning to the thing takes us away from the act of acting, although I suppose Lonergan might counter with his idea of self-appropriation. Thomas may be saying that the turning only is accessible in the phantasm of the human imagination which Rahner says will be taken up in the next section.
For now, he raises several questions about what it means to be in the world in regard to our knowing. Sensation is evaluated as a possible companion to intellect, and left as a suggestion that sensibility and intellect together might explain the one human, objective intuition. There's not enough here to evaluate except to say that our knowledge is about things and those things are known to us through our senses. Rahner asks a few questions about whether or not sensation could be like intellect in the knowing process. No doubt that intelligence and our senses combine in our experience and understanding. For Rahner, the importance of this combination is how it sets the knowing over and against the objects of experience whereas an identity of knower and known might have meant a direct intuition. This makes sensation a necessary feature that simply is different from intellect with no particular explanation.
Which brings us to the heading for this essay - the whither and the whereat. Rhaner's interpretation of Thomas is that his use of "whither" in the quiddity of the knowing refers to the necessary turn to objects, and the whereat to the object of intelligent sense. Otherwise, the nature of cognition and sensory participation only are preliminary assumptions. The only certainty is that, "the vantage point of our enquiry [is], namely, the world of experience. . . What distinguishes intellect and sense and what unifies them originally in this single knowing of the world, this has remained obscure. Up to now, only one thing has been clarified to some extent: the one knowing of the world is a relating of the known to an undefined "whither" in which the known becomes the thing standing opposite, so that this thing itself discloses itself as the unity of an intelligibility and the "whereat" of an intelligibility."
So, there is a required whither in our knowing leading to the whereat of the objects in our intelligent sense. Our knowing is through sensation which at least appears to be a feature alongside our intellect. The quiddity of knowing implies an unknown feature in this process of our turning to the world of objects. Thanks for reading. I always hope the next section will be easier!