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PRIMARY OUSIA: AN ESSAY ON ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS Z AND H. By MICHAEL J. LOUX. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. xii, 285.

The central question of metaphysics, Aristotle tells us, is "What is substance (*ousia*)?" Precisely how he intended to answer it, however, remains a matter of great dispute. In recent years, a growing number of scholars have proposed *particular forms* as the primary substances of the central books of the *Metaphysics*. Michael Loux argues against this line of interpretation, and in this book presents the most sophisticated and convincing case to date in favor of the traditional view that the primary *ousiai* of *Metaphysics* ZH are specific (that is, universal) forms.

It is Aristotle's own apparent inconsistency that causes the problems. For he seems to favor both a *subject* criterion and an *essence* criterion for being a substance, and it is difficult to see how any single candidate can satisfy both criteria. The ultimate subjects are particulars, whereas essences correspond to definitions, which are always of universals. Loux's resolution of this inconsistency depends on two controversial assumptions. The first is that by the end of Z.3 Aristotle has abandoned the subject criterion; the second is that in Z.13 Aristotle does not argue that universals cannot be substances. Rather, Z.13 claims that no universal is both the substance and essence of the particulars of which it is predicated. The form that is common to all the members of a species, then, is a "such" and not a "this"—a universal that is the substance and essence of itself.

The linchpin of Loux's interpretation is the distinction between form and species. This distinction is easy to miss, since Aristotle uses the same word (*eidos*) for both concepts. Although many interpreters would deny its tenability, Loux presents impressive evidence in favor of this distinction. Corresponding to this ambiguity in *eidos*, Loux maintains, is a systematic ambiguity in Aristotle's use of substance words such as 'man' and 'horse', between a "pure product" sense in which they denote forms and a "mixed product" sense in which they denote species. Most of the evidence for these distinctions is found in Z.7-9, chapters generally regarded as independent of the rest of Z and most probably a later interpolation. Loux acknowledges the irrelevance of much of these chapters to their surrounding context, but argues that they make precisely the points that are needed to bridge the gap from Z.6 to Z.10.

Loux notices that Aristotle uses two different linguistic formulations to

signal the distinction between form-predication and species-predication. On the one hand, a substance is a "this something" (*tode ti*); on the other hand, it is a "this such" (*tode toionde*). Each of these expressions designates a different predicative complex; the two complexes have different subjects and different predicates. In the first formulation, a species is predicated of one of its specimens; in the second, form is predicated of matter. (Of course, it is the same substantial individual that can be analyzed in either of these two ways.) This important distinction is commonly ignored, and Loux's development of it is original and compelling.

As Loux conceives of them, form and species operate on different ontological levels. A substance-species is predicated of the composite particulars that belong to it; it is their essence. This species-predication is explained by an underlying form-predication, in which the corresponding substance-form is predicated of the parcels of matter composing those particulars. Since form is predicated accidentally of matter, it is not the essence or *ousia* of what it is predicated of. Rather, it is the essence and *ousia* of itself; in another sense, it is the *ousia* of the particulars of which its corresponding species is the essence. The fundamental explanatory role of form-predications makes forms the ultimate explanatory entities, or *ousiai*.

Z.13 is the major stumbling block for any proponent of the traditional interpretation. For Loux the problem is that the form *man* is the *ousia* of both Socrates and Callias, and the species *man* is the essence of both Socrates and Callias. That is, two different things can have the same substance and the same essence. This appears to conflict with (what Loux calls) the *idion* premise of the first argument in Z.13: "things whose *ousia* is one and essence is one are themselves one" (1038b14). Loux claims that this conflict depends on a "far-fetched" reading of the *idion* premise; the "most natural reading," he claims, is that no two things have *one and the same thing* as both *ousia* and essence. But I doubt that this is the most natural or even a plausible reading of the Greek; what is worse, it makes the argument (1038b9–15) invalid. For Aristotle tries to derive from the *idion* premise the conclusion that a universal cannot be the substance of any of its instances. His argument therefore requires the stronger premise that things are one if they have the same substance. On Loux's interpretation, the premise is weaker, and hence supports only the weaker conclusion that no universal can be both the substance *and essence* of any of its instances. The weaker conclusion need not embarrass an interpreter who takes 'essence' in this passage to be a gloss on 'substance'. But a sharp distinction between substance and essence is a cornerstone of Loux's interpretation.

Primary Ousia should be read by everyone with a serious interest in Aristotle. Its sharp focus and straightforward style will be appreciated by students seeking guidance through the tangled thickets of *Metaphysics* ZH.

Scholars will be rewarded by its detailed arguments and its careful consideration of alternative views. (Particularly welcome is a lengthy discussion of the rival Frede-Patzig interpretation.) *Primary Ousia* is best treated as a continuous essay, to be read straight through. Lacking an *index locorum* and with a general index that is meager except for proper names, its usefulness as a reference work will, unfortunately, be limited. The volume has been attractively printed; I noticed about thirty misprints, all of them minor.

S. MARC COHEN

University of Washington

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TWO STUDIES IN THE EARLY ACADEMY. By R. M. DANCY. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. xii, 219.

This book makes a useful contribution to the study of the Academy under Plato's leadership by examining what is known of the metaphysical theory of two of Plato's prominent followers, Eudoxus and Speusippus. It cannot be viewed as a study of the Old Academy in general, for it nowhere pays close attention to Xenocrates or Philip of Opus, for whom we appear to have more extensive evidence. The "breadth" in the book stems rather from Dancy's willingness to introduce comparable theories from the Presocratics or Hellenistic philosophy where it suits him. The bulk of the Speusippan contribution, which displays excellent judgment and is superbly documented, has previously been published in *Ancient Philosophy*, and therefore the book's value is determined more by the Eudoxan essay and the degree to which it complements the original study.

At first sight the relation between the two studies is less than clear. However the Eudoxus piece is about a theory which accounts for a particular's having a certain property in terms of an "Ideal F," as it were, which is itself F, immanent within the particular; while the final focus of the Speusippan piece is his "principle of alien causality," whereby if x is the cause of all instances of F-ness then it *cannot* itself be an instance of F. The relevance of both theories to the debate on Plato's own Theory of Ideas, and particularly to the *Phaedo*'s theme of Ideas as (self-predicating?) causes, is obvious. This would seem to allow plenty of scope for contrasting Eudoxus and Speusippus on this key metaphysical issue, as well as in ethics, for they played key opposing roles in the Academic debate on the value of pleasure (*EN* 10.2–3; cf. 1.12, 7.11–12), and were in the forefront