Kripke: "A Puzzle about Belief"

De re vs. *de dicto* belief attributions

De re (= wide scope, "relational"):

"Jones believes, of Cicero, that he was bald."

De dicto (= narrow scope, "notional"):

"Jones believes that: Cicero was bald."

Substitutivity

- is (by definition) valid in *de re* belief attributions.

- appears to be invalid in *de dicto* belief attributions.

- appears to be valid in *de dicto* belief attributions, according to the Millian theory of proper names.

Shakespeareanism

A context is **Shakespearean** iff codesignative **names** can be substituted in it *salva veritate*.

Some General Principles

(S) *De dicto* belief contexts are Shakespearean.

(D) The Disquotational Principle

Weak form: "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to '*p*', then he believes that *p*."

Strengthened form: "A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to '*p*' if and only if he believes that *p*."

(T) The Translation Principle

"If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that other language)."

Kripke's Strategy

Since the Millian (= Kripkean) theory of names is committed to (S),

Show that (S) is not responsible for substitutivity puzzles, because

(D) and (T) alone give rise to the puzzles. In fact, (D) and (T) entail (S).