Kaplan: "Quantifying In"

Notional Belief ('B')

> 16. Hegel **B** "nine is greater than five"

Relational Belief ('Bel')

> 18. Hegel **Bel** ("x is greater than five," nine)

Quantifying into (18) is no problem. We get:

> $\exists y$ Hegel **Bel** ("x is greater than five," y)

The denotation predicate, Δ

> Δ("nine," nine)
>
> Δ("Cicero," Cicero)
>
> Δ("the man in the brown hat," Ortcutt)

Fregean version of relational in terms of notional belief

> 25. $\exists\alpha[\Delta(\alpha, \text{nine}) \wedge$ Hegel **B** ($\ulcorner\alpha$ is greater than five$\urcorner$)]

Exportation: does (26) imply (29)?

(26) Ralph **B** "the man in the brown hat is a spy"

(29) Ralph **Bel** ("x is a spy," the man in the brown hat)

The proposed "Fregean" version of (29) is:

(31) $\exists\alpha[\Delta(\alpha, \text{the man in the brown hat}) \wedge$ Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$]

But since it is "nearly analytic" that

> Δ("the man in the brown hat," the man in the brown hat)

(31) follows from (26). So the "Fregean" analysis justifies exportation.

Exportation rejected

(38) Ralph **B** "$\exists y \; y$ is a spy"

(39) Ralph **B** "the shortest spy is a spy"

(40) Ralph **Bel** ("x is a spy," the shortest spy)

(41) $\exists y$ Ralph **Bel** ("x is a spy," y)

Clearly, (38) does not entail (41). But if we allow exportation (the move from (39) to (40)), we can derive (41) from (38).

Vivid Names, etc.

A name represents an object for a person if it denotes the object, is *of* the object, and is (sufficiently) vivid:

"α represents x to Ralph if and only if (i) α denotes x, (ii) α is a name *of x* for Ralph, and (iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid."

Final Analysis

Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy.

Ralph **Bel** ("x is a spy," Ortcutt).

(44) $\exists\alpha$ [**R**(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$].

Note carefully

Not every α such that **R**(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) makes (44) true.

Let α = "the man in the brown hat":

Then **R**(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$.

Let α = "the man seen at the beach":

Then **R**(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) and ¬Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$.

Where we can quantify in

From a relational belief ascription:

(44) $\exists\alpha$ [**R**(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$].

We may quantify in:

(44a) $\exists y \exists\alpha$ [**R**(α, y, Ralph) & Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$]

And we can obtain (44) from:

(30) Ralph **B** "the man in the brown hat is a spy"

Because we also have:

R ("the man in the brown hat," Ortcutt, Ralph)

Where we can't quantify in

From the notional belief ascription:

(39) Ralph **B** "the shortest spy is a spy"

we cannot obtain the relational belief ascription:

(39a) $\exists\alpha$ [**R**(α, the shortest spy, Ralph) & Ralph **B** $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner$]

because:

¬$\exists x$ **R** ("the shortest spy," x, Ralph)