

Aristotle's Definition of *Kinêsis*: Physics III.1

[following Kosman, *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 40-62]

1. Aristotle's definition at 201^a10-11 (alternative to Fine-Irwin transl.):

“Change (motion) is the actuality of that which potentially is, *qua* such.” (*hê tou dunamei ontos entelecheia hêi toiouton*)

2. Actuality (*entelecheia*) and potentiality (*dunamis*)

Potentiality	Actuality
Bricks and stones	a house
Bronze	a statue
Seed	a tree

3. The process/product ambiguity: does *entelecheia* mean “actuality” (product sense) or “actualization” (process sense)?
4. The correct account must have these features:
 - a. *entelecheia* means **actuality** (in the product sense).
 - b. the potentiality is the potentiality to **be** (the product), not to **do** (the process).
 - c. the definiens applies to the **process** (not the product).
 - d. it has the *qua* clause play an important role in the definition.
5. **Deprivative** vs. **constitutive** perfections of an imperfection.
6. Three levels of actuality and potentiality. Cf. *De An.* II.1 (412^a21-22) and II.5 (417^a21-b2). Change is a **first** actuality (= a **second** potentiality).
7. The process of change is the **being actual of the potentiality** of the product of the change.
8. The concluding lines of III.1, 201^b10-15 (translation SMC):

“For the actuality of the buildable is either housebuilding or a house. But when there is a house, the buildable no longer exists — rather the buildable gets built. Therefore the actuality [of the buildable] must be the housebuilding. And housebuilding is a kind of process. But now the same account will apply to the other processes as well.”