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H. Dennis Park
parkhd@u.washington.edu
Office: Lewis 129
Hours by appointment
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Research
General Research Interests: Technology Entrepreneurship
- Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) and Venture Capital (VC)
- Competition between incumbents and new entrants with disruptive technologies
Dissertation: "The influence of corporate investors on the development and
performance of new ventures”
A growing number of new ventures consider corporate venture capitalists (CVC) as a complementary or alternative
source of capital to independent VCs. Corporate investors are presumed to provide valuable strategic resources for
new ventures, yet few studies have investigated how CVC investments influence the development and performance of
new ventures. These papers from my dissertation investigate how corporate investors influence governance,
strategic choices, and performance outcomes of new ventures..
Abstracts of individual essays:
"The influence of multiple agency conflicts between corporate and independent venture capitalists
on strategic choices of new ventures"
Agency theory assumes that owners (principals) have a unified voice to maximize residual claims of a firm. However,
corporate and independent venture capitalists (VCs) can have conflicting interests because corporate VCs invest in
new ventures for strategic reasons and may be less concerned with simply maximizing financial returns from new ventures.
I investigate how these divergent interests shape governance structures and strategic choices of new ventures. I find
that corporate VCs are less likely to obtain board rights compared to independent VCs and CVC-funded ventures are
more likely to take an innovation oriented strategy compared to their IVC-funded counterparts..
"When does corporate venture capital add value for new ventures?" (Job market paper)
New ventures face a tradeoff in considering corporate venture capital (CVC) funding. Corporate investors can provide
complementary assets that enhance the commercialization of new venture technologies. However, tight links with
particular corporate investors can constrain new ventures and their flexibility in accessing complementary assets
from diverse sources. Taking this tradeoff into account, I explore those instances when CVC funding adds value to
new ventures. Using a computer, semiconductor, and wireless venture sample, I find that CVC-funded ventures outperform
those new ventures solely funded by independent venture capital when they require specialized complementary assets
and operate in uncertain environments.
Last updated on 07/01/2009
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