If one were to ask a historian to divide the 20th Century at one point, the answer would predictably be World War II. The events of the first half of the century lead up to it, and the events of the second are in important ways its repercussions. However, the same question posed about the 19th Century, gives no similarly obvious answer. In the United States, the Civil War; in Germany and Italy, the years of unification; in the United Kingdom, perhaps the Reform Laws; and in Japan, the arrival of the Black Ships or the Meiji Restoration.
In the case of Japan, the two events mentioned are of course closely related. The historical literature on the Bakufumatsu period leaves little doubt about the fragility of the Tokugawa regime even before the coming of Commodore Perry. However, it is difficult the pro-imperial forces that came to power would have charted the course of modernization and Westernization that they did without that clear push (or shove) in such a direction.
The Meiji oligarchs set their sights on nothing less than achieving Great Power status for Japan, and this meant economic and military development of the nation. Though many scholars have pointed out how this emphasis on military development often retarded economic growth, I argue in this paper that this was not give-and-take between these two forces, but rather that both were simply tools used to achieve the real political goals more readily. This can be demonstrated through the examples of the two foreign wars fought during the Meiji Era, the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. When examined politically, both are fair examples of the international imperialist politics of the time period, simply the Meiji government playing the same dangerous military games as the Western powers. On the other hand, while the Sino-Japanese War was partially beneficial economically, the Russo-Japanese War was an economic disaster.
At the beginning of the Meiji Era, Japan was politically divided and economically far behind the Western nations whose international status it desired. Astute Meiji leaders quickly consolidated power, however, and the last major opposition to the government was destroyed with the defeat of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. Additionally, as noted by many historians, as a latecomer to industrialization Japan had several models to look at, enabling the country to plan more successfully and even direct growth in some ways.
The Meiji government is credited with perhaps the most successful economic ``catch-up'' ever undertaken. Relieving the government of the economic burdens which had crippled and destroyed the Tokugawa was the crucial first step. This meant two steps would have to be taken, the abolition of the stipends paid to samurai families and the creation of a national currency.
The first was principally taking over the daily administration of the Han and removing the stipends given to the samurai families. The four Han that had supported the Emperor's Restoration accomplished this in a political move. The lands of Choshu, Satsuma, Hizen, and Tosa were given to the Emperor, and the former Daimyo became the governor of the same land under the new administrative unit, Ken (Prefectures). Most other Daimyo followed suit, so in 1871 the government abolished all Han, replaced the annual stipends with lump-sum payments, and governed the Ken from Tokyo. In 1873, the government created the Home Ministry to deal with the administration of these Ken, which were subsequently reorganized.
Currency reform was another pressing matter. During the Tokugawa period, gold, silver, and feudal domain currencies were all common, but the Meiji government wanted a single currency for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Tokugawa government had been often at the mercy of the gold-silver exchange rate for its income from other parts of Japan. The government's efforts in currency reform had only limited success, however, until the abolition of the Han, as each Han could also issue its own currency. The Yen was first issued in 1872, though it was not until 1897 that the government was able to attain the gold standard common in international trade.
Another step these new and mostly young leaders took was a massive cultural exchange program with the West. Just as many of these leaders had traveled and studied in Europe or the United States for their education, thousands of Japanese were sent abroad on government scholarships. Additionally, Western teachers were hired by the government to teach a variety of subjects in the mandatory schools (established in 1872), ensuring an educated labor force for the future.
Obviously each of these actions by the government had a considerable cost, which was not met easily by a new government without a large income. Though some small loans from the West were given to support the new regime, the most important source of revenue was a land tax. This tax made up almost 60% of revenue up until the 1890s, and continued to provide significant income to the end of the era,1 by which time industrialization was well underway.
Each of these steps-centralizing government, currency reform, and education-were both part of the modernization which would make Japan a Great Power and simply foundations which would allow such development. This is also a workable description for what we today call infrastructure, the modern means of mass transportation and communication, which Japan was also developing at this point.
Some of the basics of a modern industrial economy are things that we often hardly notice but use regularly. During the Tokugawa Era, Japan had no postal service and the fastest form of travel was horseback or boat. In 1869, the Meiji government established a steamship line between Tokyo and Osaka, and in 1871 incorporated the postal and telegraph services. Railroad became the next step in industrial infrastructure, and for this the government was able to get loans abroad. For example, British loans financed the first rail line in Japan, between Tokyo and Yokohama.2 Still, most of the railroads were developed with only government encouragement by private firms.
With these prerequisites in place or being developed, the government then turned to the actual stuff of Western industrialization: factories and mechanized production. The Tokugawa government and a few Daimyo had already experimented with Western factories during the old regime, but the Meiji leaders pursued industrialization on a larger scale and more systematically, a must for a nation attempting to make up lost time.
The government first concentrated on industries in which Japan already had a natural advantage, such as silk processing. Japan had a large domestic silk industry relying on local producers during the Tokugawa Era due to the importance of silk clothing for people of certain status. The government saw this as an opportunity for industrial growth, since the international silk trade was growing and the Western equipment needed for automation was relatively inexpensive.
The automation in silk production showed immediate positive effects in terms of both the quality and amount of silk. National production nearly doubled in the first 15 years of industrial activity (1868-1883), and by the end of Meiji in 1912 silk production was at about 12 times its 1868 level.3 Misfortune in Europe, where a silkworm disease killed eggs and ruined crops, also aided the infant industry. This enabled producers to sell excess eggs as well as train workers to use the new machinery at a critical time in the development of the industry.
The Meiji government actually played a surprisingly small role in the development of the early silk industry (as well as other textile industries). The first plants were started by those already involved in the industry, for example former Daimyo of silk-producing areas, and governmental involvement was limited mainly to loans and importation of equipment resold to entrepreneurs through installments, a key but hardly central role.
This cannot be said about the government's involvement in some of the heavy industries that arose after their textile counterparts. Heavy industries, such as mining, iron smelting, or shipbuilding, required a much larger initial investment of capital, and skilled engineers and other workers who were needed were not readily available. Additionally, Japan had a low level of natural resources in this area. Even the extant coalfields were of low quality, leading even those in coal-mining areas to import higher quality coal for some tasks.
As I noted earlier, however, at the beginning of the Meiji Era the government had little money to spare, and so the heavy industrial sector of the economy did not begin to grow at a substantial rate until after 1890. Still, though the government was instrumental in setting up these key industries, many factories were later sold off to private companies in order to raise immediately needed money or to encourage private initiative. In this way some large shipbuilding companies, such as Mitsui Marine, began.
The government probably first became involved in the sector because of heavy industries' strategic implications. The Meiji leaders were aware of the dangers of unwillingness to accept Western ways, but also of the over-dependence on Western suppliers that could just as easily lead to de facto colonization of their nation, especially in the area of military weapons. For Japan to successfully become an 'expanding nation' like its Western counterparts, production of strategic military arms must be self-sufficient.
Therefore the first government heavy industrial plants were military arsenals. As noted by Kozo Yamamura, however, the term `arsenal' may be misleading since not everything produced was distinctly for military use, and a large percentage of their work was done for the private sector. For example, the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, created from an old Bakufu ironworks, ``produced mining and other machinery as well as repaired twice as many foreign and privately-owned Japanese ships as navy ships.''4 A large expense for the growing Japanese industries, both light and heavy, at this time was machine tools. Japanese exchange students easily acquired the knowledge necessary to produce many types of these tools, but the cost of producing them in Japan was prohibitively high due to the cost of imported iron and steel, leading the government to make heavy-metal processing one of their top priorities. The first large furnace for this purpose was at the Osaka Army Arsenal being used in 1884 for producing ``a large quantity of explosives and large shells and a variety of larger cannon.''5 There were only four of these arsenals, two army and two navy, but even this small-scale helped Japanese industry in several ways. First of all, as mentioned they were not used only for military purposes, but rather supplied a number of smaller private firms with machinery cheaper than it would have been available from Western trading companies. Also, without the government's initiative, private industrial firms would not have been able to enter the same industries (such as making steel) as easily or with as good an idea of the problems facing them as they later did.
However, as mentioned earlier on the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan still had a small overall heavy industrial production capacity. The economy was at best a partially industrialized one. There was quite a high literacy rate, communication and transportation were faster than ever, and a few light industries-notably silk and other textiles-were the principle exports. In heavy manufacturing, however, Japan was not only far from being self-sufficient, but still had to import virtually all industrial materials such as processed steel or iron.
By this time, the government was ready to test its modernized military. Japanese foreign policy in some respects returned to the tone it had taken in the days of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, before Tokugawa isolationism. That is, Japan once more became aware of its national strength and looked for ways to 'participate' in world affairs the same way in which the Western powers did, and it was not too long before it got a chance.
Korea had always been the most accessible foreign nation, and so it is natural that Korea was the first place Japan attempted to influence. However, at this time Korea, a de facto independent state, was officially under the rule of the Manchu Dynasty of China. Western nations tentatively decided that Korea was a partially independent state under heavy Chinese influence. The conflict of Japanese and Chinese interests had led to the Treaty of Teintsin in April 1885. Also known as the Li-Ito Conference from the Chinese and Japanese ambassadors Hung-Chang Li and Hirobumi Ito, this agreement stated that neither Japan nor China would introduce troops into Korea without prior written notice to the other power.
However, in 1894 the Tonghak, an illegal political group, rebelled in Korea, and worried Korean officials requested Chinese military support, which was sent. This violation of the Treaty of Teintsin gave Japan the required pretext for a war. Japan had been nervous about going to war without a certain amount of prestige in the West for fear of European reprisals, but on 16 July 1894 Japan concluded a new treaty revision with the British Empire. This treaty, which provided an end to British extraterritoriality rights in Japan in exchange for free access to the interior, gave Japan the desired support. On 1 August of the same year war was declared with China.
Japan's modernized navy and army proved much more prepared for war than did the Chinese military. By the end of September, the Japanese Army had defeated the best Chinese troops and occupied Pyongyang and the Navy had expelled the Chinese fleet from the Yellow Sea. In October, Japan invaded the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria, on a direct route from Korea to the Chinese capital, Peking. In about five more months, Japanese troops occupied Lushun (later Port Arthur) and Darien on the Liaotung as well as Weihaiwei in Shantung, threatening Peking.
The Chinese sued for peace on 20 March 1895, and an armistice was declared on 30 March. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, again negotiated by Ito and Li, was signed on 17 April. China granted Korea independence (in effect placing it within the Japanese sphere of influence), ceded Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands to Japan, leased the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, paid Japan a 360 million yen indemnity, and agreed to immediately negotiate a new Commerce and Navigation Treaty. This second treaty, concluded in 1896, gave Japan rights to trade along the Yangtze River and to engage in manufacturing in China. Additionally, it granted extraterritoriality to Japanese citizens in China, 3 years before Western extraterritoriality expired in Japan itself.
At the conclusion of the treaty, it appeared that Japan had emerged as a power in the East nearly equal to those in the West. Some Western Powers, however, were displeased with this, and only one week later the Dreibund of Germany, France, and Russia demanded on threat of war that Japan give up its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan sought help from the other Western Powers, but both Britain and the United States remained silent, so on 4 May 1896 Japan accepted the demand. Less than two years later, Russia herself leased the peninsula.
According to E.H. Norman, a post-World War II scholar of modern Japan, this war and its results-the victory and humiliation under force-marked Japan's turning point toward imperialism.6 The beginning of Japanese imperialism was no more popular than Western imperialism with Japan's neighbors; in recently acquired Formosa, a rebellion forced the Japanese to station a considerable number of troops there and taught Japan the facts of colonial life.
The economic consequences of the war are of course complex and impossible to separate from the economic climate, especially from the economics of the preceding period. However, in many ways the war began a new economic period, lasting until the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which showed an improved overall economic position for the country. Though the war did not immediately cause all these changes, several of them were undeniably results of the war and the peace treaty that ended it.
During the First Sino-Japanese War itself Japan was not in an improved economic position, though of course businesses with the capacity for wartime expansion were doing quite well. Industry and commerce both continued to expand, but the cost of the war outweighed the benefits for its duration. Additionally, there were negative as well as positive consequences. How then may one claim as I do that the First Sino-Japanese War was an economically beneficial one?
The answer to this question is relatively simple and straightforward. The war resulted in economic changes that would not have taken place otherwise and that more than compensated for the war's cost. However, this judgement applies only to the economic position of Japan; I make no attempt to address the merits of the foreign policy track that the war's results also led to.
However, I still find it difficult to claim as some do that the preservation of independence would have been Japan's best role for this time period, and as such the First Sino-Japanese War was unnecessary. To me such a view seems removed from the real international political situation. Five years before the beginning of the 1894 war, the Great Powers had gathered in the less than 30-year-old but rapidly expanding German Empire for the Congress of Berlin. There they affirmed the rights of imperialism and colonization, especially the right of any nation to claim any territory that it was able to hold by force.
Post-restoration Japan already knew of the European conquests of vast lands such as South America and India, saw much of Africa fall prey to European expansionism, and took careful notice the European powers were also slowly moving China towards colonization. Reversion to Tokugawa isolationism would be not only unwise, but also impossible considering the wide needs and high costs of a modern armed forces. There was no reason for the Meiji leaders to not embark on the same expansionist type of policy as Imperial Germany, which came into existence about the same time.
Economics confirmed that it was not a time to revert to a more informed isolationism, but rather to grow and expand like the Western powers. The economics preached in the European universities attended by Japanese exchange students had expansion as its first commandment. The larger the economy, the richer the nation. However, to the Meiji leaders economic prosperity was not an end in itself, but rather a means to political goals. Thus not wastefulness or productiveness, but rather contribution to these goals judged military spending.
This should explain the reasons for the economically incongruent expenditure for the armed forces. While it is true the armed forces did not contribute directly to industrialization, but rather were more of a money drain, they were important for successful governing and achieving political goals. Additionally, as my earlier remarks on the importance of the military arsenals in early heavy industry, the money the government spent on the military could indirectly help economic growth.
Returning to the matter of economics in the First Sino-Japanese War, it is interesting to note that the war hardly strained the infant Japanese economy at all. The war cost in total about 200 million yen, compared to an average annual national budget of 80 million yen, but still the government saw no need to raise taxes, but instead covered the majority of the increase with domestic bonds.7
This increase in the government debt is one of the immediate negative impacts of the war mentioned earlier. With the government asking for private investment in a popular cause, money that would otherwise be available for investment in the growing economy-even more important at its early stage of development-was less available. Allen Kelley and Jeffrey Williamson describe the effect of this loss in chapter 7 of their Lessons from Japanese Development:
[During wartime] governments [such as Meiji] induce potential investors to increase the share of government debt in their portfolios rather than in private debt which represents claims on ``productive'' assets, that is, private capital formation.... From 1887 to 1893, the net government impact on capital formation as a share in GNP was 5.2 percent. The figure is 9.9 percent from 1906 to 1915. Compare these figures with that of the wartime as, 1894-1905:1.7 percent.8
With a quick look at the accompanying chart on the page 122 of the same work, we can see that during actual wartime this percentage was much lower, more than -5% at the lowest point. This retardation of private investment was perhaps the most serious of economic backlash of the war.
Decreased production capacity of civilian products, including export products, is another typical result of war on industrial economies. However, this war had almost the opposite effect. In exports, this was mostly due to the low percentage of heavy industrial goods Japan was able to produce. Also, the most profitable export goods, silk and other textiles, showed growth similar to non-war years of the period, probably since neither the war's adversary, China, nor the military was a large consumer of such goods.
Also, the very small heavy industrial sector of the Japanese economy showed large growth relative to its size, as one may expect during wartime of a sector dominated by military arsenals. The war was a boon to private companies in this sector as well, though, since during peacetime they had a great deal of trouble with foreign competition. The government contracts for war-related work may have even saved a few of the fledgling operations that later became industrial giants. The end of the war brought an end to these government contracts but also left them on a firmer footing.
The key economic provision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war, was of course the large indemnity (360 million yen, paid as £38 million) which China agreed to pay Japan. One may note that this is around 160 million yen more than the cost of the war itself, though Japan had additional war-related expenses from the territories acquired. The majority of this money, was not used for paying war debts or military expenditure, but was rather used to put the Japanese monetary system on the gold standard to better compete with Western nations.
A few other economic provisions in the treaty were the same Most-Favored Nation status in China for Japan as the Western powers enjoyed, the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula (which the Dreibund soon negated), the cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the right to engage in manufacturing in specified parts of China's interior. The new colonies were in some ways an economic burden at first, but also provided a larger market and supplied important goods such as sugar. The MFN status and manufacturing rights in China were both economically beneficial to Japan and confirmation of the new status of the country.
The peace treaty was not the only or even the most important economic result of the war. After the end of the war Japan may not have been recognized as a Great Power, but by defeating China became unarguably the strongest non-Western country in East Asia. This additional international prestige had two important economic results, revision of the tariff treaties and increased availability of foreign loans, which were used mainly for military expansion.
The embarrassing one-sided treaties which the Great Powers had forced Japan to sign included economic provisions such as the right to set Japan's tariffs, and these were still in effect. The 1894 revised treaty with the British Empire ended extraterritoriality when it came into effect in 1899, but conspicuously left the tariff provision intact. However, these treaties were impossible to retain once Japan began to be recognized as the predominant power in East Asia. Most treaties were revised in 1899, though Japan did not regain complete autonomy until 1911.
This new status combined with the expansionist goals of the Japanese government also meant that there would be continued conflict with the interests of one or more of the Great Powers, as there had been over the Liaotung Peninsula. Russia, with which Japan was already competing in Korea, was the most likely adversary, and a successful war with Russia would take a much greater investment of military and economic resources. Therefore the years from 1894 to 1905 were characterized by high military spending which, including both the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War, amounted to about 40% of total government expenditure. This is compared to around 25% for preceding period.
Additionally there was the matter of the foreign loans. Lenders showed themselves much more eager to cooperate with a 'stable' nation that could not only fend off Western powers but also conduct a successful foreign war. However, instead of using these loans to build up a stronger economy, the productive route, these loans were used mostly for additional military expansion.
Economically, this massive increase in military spending was illogical. The country, at an early stage in development, desperately needed even the smallest amount of capital for investment. During the period, the growth of exports also shrank compared to the preceding period despite consistent industrial growth. Though this was not necessarily only from military spending, it certainly contributed.
Even politically, expansionist goals could have been attained over a longer period of time with lower spending, but Meiji leaders saw that time was very important. With fast expansion of the military, Japan like the Western imperialists had only to wait until the right time for a war, which came in 1904. Directly, the war was caused by Russia's attempt to pursue its interests further than most of the Great Powers. In 1900, the anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion had thrown China into confusion, and Japanese troops made up the largest contingent used in suppressing the rebellion. All the Western nations used this opportunity to exact more concessions from the Chinese government.
However, Russia kept troops stationed in Manchuria well past the pacification, and used these 'peace-keepers' to influence local politics. However, Russia's move also interested other Western nations in using Japan to buffer Russian expansion. It was with this in mind that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded on 30 January 1902, giving Japan the foreign support it knew would be necessary for waging a successful war against a Western nation.
Russia continued to refuse to withdraw from Manchuria, and eventually Japan withdrew its ambassador. On 10 February 1904, Japan declared war. After a decisive naval victory off Port Arthur on 13 April, Japan invaded Russian-occupied Manchuria by land. Port Arthur itself was under siege from June 1904-January 1905. After the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese advanced toward the regional capital, Mukden. The Battle of Mukden is considered by some to be the first `modern' battle; over 400,000 Japanese and 350,000 Russian troops participated and there were more than 200,000 casualties. In May of 1905 Admiral Togo defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of the Tsushima Straits, and both sides requested President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States mediate a peace.
The peace conference took place in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and the treaty was signed on 6 September 1905. Russia withdrew from Manchuria, recognized Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence, agreed to allow Japan to lease the Liaotung Peninsula and gave Japan control of the South Manchuria Railway in that area, ceded Sakhalin Island south of the 50th Parallel, and gave Japan certain fishing rights.
Though the top politicians had expected little in terms of material gain from this politically motivated war, the Japanese people felt betrayed by the treaty. The main parts of the treaty concerned things Japan already had in fact accomplished: getting Russian troops out of Manchuria, leasing the Liaotung, and controlling Korea in their sphere of influence. All they saw were half of an Arctic Island (virtually useless for colonization) and some fishing rights for a war that had exhausted Japan financially and military.
`Exhaustion' is certainly the correct term to use for the effect of the war on the Japanese economy. Though it only lasted twenty months, about six months longer than the First Sino-Japanese War, it was still the longest modern war that the Japanese Empire had fought to that time. This, combined with the fact that Russia was economically more important than China, made the people and economy feel the war much more than had been the case during the first war.
Also, the Russo-Japanese War was far more expensive to fight than the First Sino-Japanese War had been, costing 1730 million yen compared to 200 million yen.9 Japan did not have the enormous financial resources available to many of the Western countries at this time, though the large financial markets in the British and French Empires had become available for the war effort. However, these same financial markets were careful in judging their beneficiary's ability to repay, and so as the war continued despite large expenditures capital became harder to find.
The cost was due not only to the relative strengths of China and Russia, but also the changes in military technology that had taken place in those ten years. The Japanese, like most Western counterparts, both stockpiled weapons and ammunition and estimated total production capacity in case of a war. However, the military miscalculated ``the estimated need for shells and other supplies using examples of European wars fought during the second half of the nineteenth century, [and so] began to face critical shortages of shells by the fall of 1904.''10 As the country was in the middle of a war, the only option open to them was to expand military industrial production as quickly as possible, and at high cost. This was done, and although the timing was such that a military disaster was averted, an economic disaster was in the making.
The majority of the money spent during the war, about 80%, again came from borrowing. At least two domestic bond issues were made for 100 million yen each, which again tied up a large amount of money that would otherwise be available for investment. Other sources were the foreign loans that the government took out on an unprecedented scale-drastically increasing Japan's national debt-and businesses and land tax increases. The business taxes were raised as much as 70%, and land tax doubled in urban sites and increased by about one-third in rural areas.11
Western observers were not blind to these economic warning signs. In an article published during the war, one economist remarked, ``in contrast to the extraordinary ability the Japanese have displayed in naval and military matters, [in economics they have] loans so large that they are out of all proportion to the producing ability of the people.''12 However, perhaps partly due to the popularity of Japan's fight against Russia in the West, the Japanese were able borrow enough to finish the war without an economic collapse.
The Treaty of Portsmouth influenced Japanese economics less directly than the Treaty of Shimonoseki, due to the absence of much of the economic language found in the earlier treaty. Japan could not impose on Russia the same kind of one-sided economic treaties that had been imposed on China (and earlier, on Japan), and the war was not so conclusive as to demand indemnity. Additionally, the Sakhalin required much less investment than Taiwan.
In the long run, the most important effect of the treaty took place in Korea, which had been recognized as a Japanese sphere of influence. Though at the end of the Russo-Japanese War the fate of Korea's sovereignty was far from certain, as events progressed Korea was annexed in 1910. As some have remarked, ``Japanese colonialism differed in important respects from the colonialism of European powers,''13 including a great deal of industrial development and investment. This began, though at a lower level than took place after annexation, after the Treaty of Portsmouth made Korea an official Japanese sphere of influence.
This is not to say the treaty did not have widespread economic consequences for Japan during the years immediately following. The massive debt necessitated keeping taxes at wartime levels, which is certainly a key economic event. Though this stunted post-war growth, it was not as devastating as continued war would have been since the end of the war freed a great deal of capital-investment resources. Government debt restructuring also helped to reduce the debt burden, though the amount was not reduced but only grew less important as the economy grew.
Of course, just as the First Sino-Japanese War was not entirely without negative economic consequences, the Russo-Japanese War also had some positive results. The emergency expansion of military production was probably more money than the industrial-production sector of the economy would have otherwise seen, enabling a great deal of machinery and skills to be transferred to companies which soon returned to producing civilian-use goods. Also, despite the increase in taxes, a large amount of war profit found itself in civilian hands and from there back into the economy.
As we now know the consequences of actions taken during the Meiji Era, it seems simple to point to mistakes Japan's leaders made during that time. However, even with these mistakes Meiji Japan can be considered the most successfully modernized nation. At first, these simple facts seem to suggest that other developing nations follow the lead of Japan, skipping the mistakes. It is not so simple. Still we do not know for certain why Japan modernized so successfully, or specifically what actions were correct and which were mistakes, which I hope I have demonstrated throughout this paper.
One of these actions, in a broad sense, was the Meiji emphasis on militarism, which the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were the largest expressions. Debates, perhaps irreconcilable, will continue on this subject; historians must arrange the facts without knowing whether the resulting picture is a completed puzzle or an optical illusion. Still, it is possible to examine parts of this picture in terms of other parts, and the parts that I have chosen are the economic effects of the Meiji foreign wars. I was not surprised to find an ambiguous answer.
The First Sino-Japanese War was the smaller and more beneficial of the two wars. It was beneficial not because of the war itself, which in fact had negative immediate economic effect, but because of the results of the war achieved through political means, namely the one-sided Treaty of Shimonoseki and subsequent treaty revision with the Great Powers.
The Russo-Japanese War was, as I believe even Meiji leaders might agree, a mistake as it happened. It brought at best limited political victories domestically and internationally, and it nearly caused the infant Japanese economy to collapse. Of course, this could never have been predicted beforehand, and attempts at explanation now as always simply lead us to more questions.
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